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We hypothesize that when honesty is not motivated by selfish goals, it reveals social
preferences that have evolved for convincing strategically vigilant partners that one is a
person worth cooperating with. In particular, we explain how the patterns of dishonest
behavior observed in recent experiments can be motivated by preferences for social
and self-esteem. These preferences have evolved because they are adaptive in an
environment where it is advantageous to be selected as a partner by others and where
these others are strategically vigilant: they efficiently evaluate the expected benefit of
cooperating with specific partners and attend to their intentions. We specify the adaptive
value of strategic vigilance and preferences for social and self-esteem. We argue that
evolved preferences for social and self-esteem are satisfied by applying mechanisms of
strategic vigilance to one’s own behavior. We further argue that such cognitive processes
obviate the need for the evolution of preferences for fairness and social norm compliance.
Keywords: honesty, dishonesty, evolution, prosociality, social cognition, cooperation, partner choice
INTRODUCTION
Honesty from an Evolutionary Perspective
In this paper, we consider honesty, dishonesty, and trust from an evolutionary perspective. Our
main goal is to contribute to psychological theories about the patterns of dishonesty that have
recently been documented in experimental economics. The main finding is that people tend to
cheat when there are clear incentives to do so, but they cheat only by small margins. Ariely
(2012) described this pattern as resulting from a “fudge factor.” We analyse how the fudge factor
could itself result from human evolved prosocial preferences.1 Specifically, we ask: what is the
evolutionary function of the psychological traits that grounds the observed patterns of behavior?
The evolutionary perspective leads to question why and how such traits could be adaptive, and thus
enables the formulation of hypotheses which need to be consistent with both evolutionary theory
and empirical data.
The words honesty, truthfulness, and sincerity are often used interchangeably, thus limiting the
scope of honesty to truth-telling. However, in the present paper we refer to the original and broader
meaning of the word honesty as qualifying a disposition to act according to one’s community’s
moral rules and to abide by its social norms (e.g., do not steal, do not lie, be generous). Saying
that people are honest means that one approves of their social choices and attitudes toward rules
of social interactions. Honesty is usually associated with bearing a cost: forgoing a potentially
better, but dishonest, opportunity (e.g., refraining from cheating). In our day-to-day interactions,
1Expressions in bold are explained in the glossary.
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we start with the presumption that people will be honest and we
are shocked when they are not. This might guide the investigation
of honesty and dishonesty toward finding the cause of the latter,
rather than the cause of the former. For political economy too,
the temptation is to focus on the factors that foster dishonesty:
uncovering them could guide political interventions aimed at
reducing the associated costs. From an evolutionary perspective,
however, the question is why people are honest at all. This
is a puzzle for evolutionary psychology, because honesty leads
to paying a direct opportunity cost. Often, when we say that
someone is honest, we do not mean that she is rational and
aware of the risk of punishment for misbehaving; rather, we
mean that she accepts to pay the opportunity cost for the
sake of complying to a certain rule of behavior that regulates
social interactions. Honest behavior is thus characterized by
choices where people forbear benefits so as to not deprive others
from their own benefits, conceived as their due because of
some rule. The preference that motivates honest behavior can
therefore be interpreted as prosocial.Prosocial preferences stand
in need of explanation for evolutionary theory because their
adaptive value is not obvious. We argue that explaining how the
prosocial preferences can have an adaptive value allows us to
form hypotheses about the specific content of these preferences
and the cognitive mechanisms on which they are likely to rely.
A better understanding of why and when people are motivated
to be honest can thus lead to a better grasp of the causes of
dishonesty.
Glossary
Biological markets: situations where organisms can choose partners for interactions (e.g., choice of mating partners). Adaptive decision making will lead organisms
to choose the best partner they can ‘afford’ for a given interaction (manage to convince to interact with them).
Calculated Machiavellian strategy: the combination of a preference for material benefits and an understanding that, in some strategic situations, it pays off to
invest in reputation.
Evolutionary function of psychological mechanisms: what evolved psychological mechanisms, including preferences, do, that increases inclusive fitness, thus
explaining why they have evolved.
Evolved prosocial preferences: prosocial preferences that exist because they have an evolutionary function. Evolutionary theory warrants the assumption that
such preferences will have long term positive effects on the organism’s inclusive fitness even though they motivate choices with immediate costs.
Honest choice: the term is commonly used to refer to social choices motivated by moral attitudes or guided by social norms. ‘Honest’ is used to qualify people
who are judged to be desirable cooperators because of their character (rather than because of their skills). In this paper, we use the term in a specific way: we say
that a choice is honest when one forbears benefits so as not to deprive others from benefits that are conceived as their due because of some rule. We use ‘honest
choices’ to qualify choices where complying to the rule has an opportunity cost. Thus, honest choices are a specific kind of prosocial choices. For instance, most
of the experimental results we review in this paper analyse choices to lie or tell the truth, when there is an incentive to lie. There is a rule of behavior that requests
people not to lie, and lying leads to decreasing trust, which is a common good.
Partner choice theory: a theory in evolutionary biology specifying selection pressures that would, in the human case, have influenced the evolution of social cognition
and social preferences. According to this theory, people gained fitness by pairing with (i.e., choosing and being chosen by) the best partners for cooperating in mutually
beneficial entreprises.
Prosocial behavior: behavior that benefits others at some cost to the self. The cost and benefits considered are direct consequences of the behavior, but include
opportunity costs. We argue that the long term consequences of such behavior are on average positive.
Prosocial preferences: psychological mechanisms that produce motives for making prosocial choices. We use a mentalistic notion of preferences and refer to a
psychological reality that determines choices.
Proximate mechanisms: how evolved psychological mechanisms work.
In this paper, we assert that evolved prosocial preferences and calculated Machiavellism are two different proximal mechanisms whose evolutionary function is to
manage reputation so as to do well in a market of potential cooperators.
Strategic vigilance: we coined this term to refer to a set of capacities whose function is to predict when are potential partners likely to have cooperative intentions,
and what can lead them to have such intentions. Capacities of strategic vigilance form a subset of capacities of social vigilance, which evaluate the expected payoffs
of social interactions.
Partner Choice Theory and the Evolution of
Strategic Vigilance
According to partner choice theory (see, e.g., Noë and
Hammerstein, 1995; Barclay, 2013; Baumard et al., 2013),
cooperative behavior and trust evolved in an environment
with multiple opportunities for mutually beneficial cooperation.
Seizing these opportunities, however, required being able to
cooperate with individuals who make the cooperation worth for
the self. How can one manage to cooperate with the partners who
make the cooperative actions as beneficial as possible? First, one
must be able to distinguish and select the good cooperators. A
good cooperator is one who contributes a considerable amount
of effort to a joint activity, and is efficient and competent. He
thus contributes to the production of a large benefit. To make
this cooperation beneficial for the self, it is also important that
the partners let the self benefit from the product of cooperation.
Good cooperators leave a sufficiently large share of the benefits
to their partners, and do not cause additional cost by fighting
over these benefits. Second, one must be selected for cooperative
activities by good cooperators, so one must convince them that
one is a good cooperator as well. Selection pressures therefore
ensue for the evolution of cognitive capacities and psychological
traits that: (1) discern who the good cooperators for given
activities are, and (2) convince others that one is a good
cooperator.
We hypothesize that humans have a set of cognitive capacities
that allow them to predict, with sufficient reliability, whether
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cooperation with a potential partner will be worthwhile.
Adequately choosing a partner for a cooperative activity requires
assessing the competence of the potential partner for the
task, their availability for doing the task and their willingness
or intention to cooperate (Barclay, 2013). The latter requires
vigilance because in the strategic context of partner choice, it
is in the interest of others to convince us that they are good
cooperators even if they are not. Strategic vigilance evaluates
the expected value of engaging in a cooperative activity with
potential partners in view of the selfish material interest they
might have, their honesty, generosity, moral attitude and, more
generally, their trustworthiness.2 A key feature of strategic
vigilance consists in assessing potential partners’ cooperative
dispositions. Strategic vigilance enables one to avoid cooperating
with partners who, although competent, will leave one worse off.
Imagine a scenario in which you can go hunting with the best
hunter in your community, but know he will keep most of the
prey for himself. In this case, you are better off hunting with a
less talented hunter who will share more. This is indeed what
Bird and Power (2015) found in the Martu society: hunters who
were generous and shared the most—but not who were the most
skilled—were selected the most frequently for cooperative hunts.
Partner Choice Theory and the Evolution of
Prosocial Preferences
Once a form of strategic vigilance has evolved, a new selection
pressure arises: one gains in fitness by convincing strategically
vigilant others that one is a good cooperator. Doing so will
motivate them to engage in cooperative activities that are
beneficial for oneself. The stake, then, is to manage one’s image
and reputation: the beliefs that others hold about one’s worth as a
potential cooperator.
What are the types of behavior that can efficiently convince
strategically vigilant others that one is a trustworthy cooperator;
and what is the preference that will motivate people to adopt
such behavior? Reputation management can be implemented by
means of standard preferences for material benefits, combined
with cognitive capacities that predict how behaviors affect
reputation and how likely a good reputation will lead to higher
material benefits. We can call this the calculated Machiavellian
strategy, because it requires an evaluation of the costs and
benefits of investing in reputation. When following this strategy,
people will make prosocial choices only in the situations in
which they predict that these choices will induce others to
cooperate, and that the long-term material benefits will outweigh
the cost of behaving prosocially. Humans have been shown
to increase their future benefits in this way (Nowak and
Sigmund, 1998; Wedekind and Milinski, 2000; Barclay and
Willer, 2007). Mindreading—the human capacity to understand
others’ beliefs and desires—makes such computations feasible.
This ability not only enables cooperation between non-kin
(Barrett et al., 2010), but has also been shown to be a
significant predictor of cooperativeness: people who have better
mindreading skills show a stronger tendency to cooperate (Paal
and Bereczkei, 2007). However, human psychology supplements
2Note that we are referring here to economic activities, the evolution of epistemic
trust is another yet very similar story (see Sperber et al., 2010).
calculatedMachiavellian strategies withmechanisms thatmanage
reputation without requiring the agent to conduct a deliberate
analysis of expected costs and benefits (see Section The Function
and Content of Prosocial Preferences). Such mechanisms can
induce prosocial choices without the individual intending to
derive long term benefits from these choices. For instance, one
can desire to have a good reputation per se rather than as a means
to derive long term material benefits. Concern for reputation can
induce prosocial choices without the intention to obtain material
benefits in the long term. Other such mechanisms, we will argue,
include self-concept maintenance.
Partner choice theory leads to hypothesize that some of
the human prosocial preferences evolved because they produce
behaviors that efficiently convince others to choose us for self-
beneficial cooperative activities (Sperber and Baumard, 2012).
That humans have prosocial preferences can be observed in our
day-to-day interactions with others: charitable giving, holding
the door and other civilities are all expressions of prosocial
dispositions. Honest choices (as we use the term in this paper)
also fall into this category, because they imply not taking
advantage of every opportunity to increase one’s own payoff at
the expense of someone’s else.
How can honest, or in general, prosocial choices be a means
of improving benefits to the self, since they are by definition
not consciously intended to do so, and in fact have the opposite
effect in the short-term? Even if not intended, the choices
increase expected gains and contribute to fitness by maximizing
the number of future cooperative opportunities—it is their
evolutionary function. This is the ultimate explanation of the
behavior, which specifies how it contributed to increasing the
inclusive fitness of the behaving organism in the environment
of evolutionary adaptedness. Proximate explanations, on the
other hand, specify the actual mechanisms which produce the
behavior and the conditions in which they do so. In the case of
prosocial behavior, the proximate cause can include preferring
fair outcomes, preferring to have a good reputation, preferring
to maintain self-esteem, and skills and preferences for calculated
Machiavellian strategies. These are proximate mechanisms.
The Function and Content of Prosocial
Preferences
We have a plausible hypothesis about the general evolutionary
function of prosocial preferences, but still need to specify
the selection pressures that lead to the evolution of such
psychological traits. In particular, we need to specify why
calculated Machiavellian strategies would not suffice as
proximate mechanisms for reputation management. We can
presume that calculated Machiavellian strategies were available
before prosocial preferences evolved because the capacities they
rely on are, in some form, available to non-human primates
(see, e.g., Call and Tomasello, 2008). Furthermore, selection
pressures for prosocial preferences can appear only if others are
sufficiently strategically vigilant; and strategic vigilance exactly
requires the ability to make reliable predictions about the future
behavior of others. An account of the evolution of prosocial
preferences therefore needs to answer the following question:
what selective advantage can prosocial preferences provide when
compared to a calculated Machiavellian strategy? One possibility
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is that prosocial preferences lead tomaking the adaptive choices a
calculatedMachiavellian strategy would recommend, but without
paying the cost of computing the probability that the choice will
indeed influence the audience’s behavior in a way that sufficiently
increases future benefits. However, given our dedicated skills to
predicting others’ behavior, sparing the cognitive cost of strategic
computation can only be a small advantage, especially given
that social preferences necessarily lead to making ‘mistakes.’ In
view of their evolutionary function, prosocial preferences lead
to false positives: decisions to act generously, while the expected
consequences—in terms of material benefits—are not worth
the cost. Another possible advantage of social preferences can
be found if considered through the lens of error management
(Haselton and Buss, 2000): while social preferences can lead
to false positives, they also importantly reduce the number
of false negatives. In that context, a false negative consists
in failing to act prosocially because one underestimates the
positive future consequences of the prosocial act for the self. For
instance, one can incorrectly believe she is not being observed
and decide to cheat, consequently being ostracized from her
group. Mechanisms for decreasing the rate of false negatives
can be heuristics that supplement the calculated Machiavellian
strategy. For instance, choices are often sensitive to the presence
of an audience: observability has been shown to be one of
the primary factors which lead to increasing cooperation in
real-world situations (for a recent review, see Kraft-Todd
et al., 2015). However, people are not necessarily aware of this
influence: the mere presence of photos of eyes has been shown
to increase generosity and norm abidance in various settings,
presumably because it triggers unconscious mechanisms for
reputation management (Haley and Fessler, 2005; Bateson et al.,
2006; for a meta-analysis of relevant constraints see Sparks
and Barclay, 2013). Altruism can be prompted unconsciously
by environmental cues that directly affect behavior. Prosocial
preferences, however, are mechanisms that do not affect behavior
directly, but do so via motivations which, in turn, affect planning
and choice, and—eventually—behavior. They can trigger
the conscious willingness to altruistically benefit others, or,
equivalently, not to dishonestly exploit them.
Bounded rational agents (Simon, 1982) are unable to foresee
many of the long term positive consequences of prosocial choices.
Because of the preference for immediate gains, choices stemming
from Machiavellian strategies are likely to miss many occasions
to act prosocially for future benefits—i.e., to issue false negatives.
This is especially plausible in a market of cooperators where
people have to compete to be selected for cooperative activities.
Moreover, this competition does not fully occur at the level of
choice, but includes the level of the underlying motivations of
the choices as well. This is because selectors are strategically
vigilant; and know that someone who made an altruistic choice
because of selfish intentions is less likely to cooperate in the future
than someone who made an altruistic choice because of prosocial
preferences (Karabegovic and Heintz, in preparation). In that
context—where strategically vigilant agents take intentions into
account—candidates for partnership have no choice but tomimic
prosocial dispositions. Now, if the selectors’ strategic vigilance is
accurate enough, the best way to appear as someone who has
prosocial preferences is to be someone who actually has such
preferences. In the next section, we will argue that strategically
vigilant others are likely to tell apart strategic motivations from
genuinely prosocial ones.
Partner choice theory specifies the selection pressures for the
evolution of prosocial preferences as follows:
• Multitude of beneficial cooperative opportunities.
• Seizing these opportunities requires convincing potential
cooperators that one is a better cooperator than others.
Partner choice theorists have made the two above points clear,
and this has enabled them to specify the function of prosocial
dispositions. The specification of the selection pressures and
evolutionary dynamics that operate on the market of cooperators
provides ground for developing hypotheses about the most
efficient means for matching with good partners. For instance,
Baumard et al. (2013) have argued that a preference for fairness
is such a means: it is an adaptive mechanism for partner choice.
These analyses focused on the mechanism responsible for being
selected. Little attention has been given to the other side of the
evolutionary process: the mechanisms enabling the selection (but
see Sperber and Baumard, 2012). However, it is equally important
to understand the mechanisms that enable the selection of
partners, because they form a crucial aspect of the selection
pressures. We thus add a third point to the list above:
• The potential cooperators to be convinced are strategically
vigilant.
What does it really take to convince strategically vigilant others
that one is a good cooperator? Our claim is that dealing with
this question might help explain the patterns of behavior that
have not been sufficiently considered by partner choice theorists:
patterns of generosity (Heintz et al., 2015), but also—the focus of
this paper—patterns of dishonesty.
In this view, social preferences are mechanisms which
motivate behavior that strategically vigilant others would value.
An adaptive preference achieving that goal is a preference for
being a good cooperator according to the potential judgments
of strategically vigilant and worthy cooperators. To recover that
judgment, one can put one’s own strategic vigilance to work on
one’s own behavior. The experiments on dishonesty we review
in the next section suggest exactly that: people want to think of
themselves as good cooperators, and this enables them to cheat,
but only a little. In the third section we go back to what we know
about strategic vigilance, and in the last section, contrast our
hypothesis with the preference for norm-abidance and preference
for fair outcomes: two other preferences that could provide the
evolved basis of prosocial dispositions.
PROXIMATE MECHANISMS OF
STRATEGIC VIGILANCE
How Is Strategic Vigilance Exercised?
Partner choice theory specifies a set of problems that our
ancestors had to solve in order to benefit from cooperative
ventures. We identified two subsets: first, they had to decide
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whether to enter a specific cooperative venture with a
potential partner. This problem implies choosing with whom
to cooperate among the available potential partners. Second,
they had to maximize the overall value of beneficial cooperative
opportunities. In a biological market (term coined by Noë
and Hammerstein, 1994, 1995), this involves inducing the best
potential partners to choose to cooperate with oneself. In a
market of strategically vigilant others, it means convincing them
that one is a partner worth cooperating with. The hypothesis of
partner choice theorists is that having prosocial preferences is one
means to do exactly that. We want to further investigate what it
plausibly takes to convince strategically vigilant others that one is
a good partner. In order to do that, in this section we review a set
of studies about the proximate mechanisms of strategic vigilance.
How are potential partners evaluated and how are predictions
about their behavior formed? In that process, which aspects of
potential partners’ behavior are being especially attended to?
Strategic vigilance is most probably implemented by means
of multiple cognitive mechanisms. These might include evolved
capacities that allow people to detect potential cheaters, based on
simple cues in a quick and efficient way, so that they can avoid
unfruitful interactions with them (e.g., Cosmides and Tooby,
1992; Sugiyama et al., 2002; Petersen et al., 2012). Similarly, but
independently from cheater detection, people might possess an
evolved ability to identify prosocial and altruistic attitudes of
others (Brown and Moore, 2000; Oda et al., 2006). However,
incentives for prosocial or dishonest actions vary from context
to context, and studies have shown that certain external factors,
such as group membership or social distance, affect how
prosocially people behave (e.g., Hoffman et al., 1996; Chen and
Li, 2009; Engel, 2011). Furthermore, people are able to modulate
their expectations of others’ prosociality in view of these external
factors (e.g., Goette et al., 2006).
Even though prosociality and dishonesty might be limited to
the actual situation, the rich and blooming literature on moral
judgments shows that people are able to make more abstract
and more general moral evaluations of others (e.g., Haidt, 2007;
Greene et al., 2009). This ability and tendency to make moral
judgments is also tightly connected to strategic vigilance, because
these judgments inform partner choice decisions.
There is ample evidence showing that people form social
judgments in a way that is relevant for assessing potential
partners, e.g., people who are honest or dishonest, nice or
nasty, generous or selfish, competent, or incompetent, and so
on. Two dimensions which reflect this evolutionary pressure
emerge consistently in the literature on social perception:
warmth (which encompasses the honest-dishonest, nice-nasty,
and generous-selfish dichotomies) and competence (Fiske et al.,
2007). How people predict behaviors in a cooperative context is
also relevant to understanding strategic vigilance. Several studies
have investigated whether participants can predict their partner’s
decision in experimental settings. When people can observe their
partner’s past choices, they can predict future choices by using
fairly simple strategies such as reinforcement learning (see e.g.,
Erev and Roth, 1998). However, there is convincing evidence
that people can predict others’ choices even without observing
their past behavior. In prisoner’s dilemma games participants
are able to predict their partner’s choice with an accuracy rate
significantly above chance if they are allowed to meet in person
and communicate before decision-making (Dawes et al., 1977;
Frank et al., 1993; Brosig, 2002). Similar results have been
obtained for high-stake, real life settings as well: third-party
observers were able to predict game show participants’ choices at
an accuracy above chance (Belot et al., 2012). Other studies have
shown that people can predict others’ choices without having
any prior interaction—for instance, when they were presented
a single photo of the partner (Yamagishi et al., 2003; Eckel and
Petrie, 2011). Verplaetse et al. (2007) showed that even third-
party observers are able to distinguish cheaters from cooperators,
based on a single photo that was taken of the target person at the
moment of decision-making.
Eventually, one would like to know how people actually
choose their partners. There are only a few experiments and
field studies which examine such strategies (e.g., Delton and
Robertson, 2012; Lyle and Smith, 2014; Bird and Power, 2015).
Mindreading and moral judgments are definitively central to
deciding when and with whom to cooperate. However, in
this section we will focus on the ascription and evaluation of
intentions of potential partners.
We argue that one important way strategic vigilance is
exercised is by representing and evaluating others’ intentions.
In the next section, we will review evidence showing that
the judgment about the honesty of a choice depends on
the underlying intentions the choice reveals. Thus, inferences
about underlying intentions are at the core of both strategic
vigilance and prosocial choices. We will argue that honesty
is driven by exercising strategic vigilance to one’s own
choice.
Computing Intentions Gives Predictive
Power
We gather information about others’ past behavior and the
outcome of their actions, either through direct experience or
through indirect channels, such as reputation systems. How do
we infer future behavior on the basis of these data? In particular,
how do we predict potential partners’ behavior in a given
cooperative venture? The main difficulty is that the willingness
to cooperate depends on unobservable mental factors which can
only be inferred from instances of past actions and the context in
which they transpired.
An outcome-based assessment of potential partners calculates
the benefits derived from past interactions with a partner, and
leads to the conclusion that the expected benefits of future
interactions are similar. Several variations can be implemented:
for instance, averaging the payoffs of past cooperative ventures
with a given person and assuming that the future benefit will
be around this average, or giving larger weights to more recent
payoffs (e.g., reinforcement learning: Erev and Roth, 1998;
experience-weighted attraction learning: Camerer andHo, 1999).
The relevant aspect of such processes, however, is that they do
not compute partners’ intentions. We argue below, first, that
predicting behavior on the basis of inferred underlying intentions
allows for more accurate predictions, and second, that humans
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actually do compute and evaluate the intentions of potential
partners.
Outcome-based inferential processes are limited on two
fronts. For one thing, humans interact on a wide range of tasks,
but outcome-based cognitive processes do not allow making
reliable inferences from behavior observed in one type of task
to another. For instance, Jenny might be a competent football
player, yet an enthusiastic but poor writer. Therefore, if co-
authoring with Jenny is not worthwhile, we cannot conclude
that being on her football team would be similarly painful. In
order to evaluate across tasks, people distinguish underlying
intentions, preferences and task-specific capacities. For another
thing, outcome-based cognitive processes do not enable making
reliable predictions when the context changes, even if the task
remains the same. In particular, the partner’s incentives and
situational constraints can change from observed past choices to
the present situation. For instance, the probability of meeting and
having an interaction with a particular partner might drastically
decrease and approximate zero. In that case, the expected
value of signaling prosociality diminishes because there will be
no further opportunities for mutually beneficial cooperation—
the incentives have changed. In such cases, past benefits of
cooperation become a poor predictor because the context has
changed with regard to the future.
Outcomes in and of themselves do not reflect the intention
of the agent. For instance, a selfish agent can help and be
generous, but only to rip off the naive agent at the most
opportune occasion down the line. Similarly, a helpful agent
can simply fail to deliver benefits because of an unlucky set of
circumstances. Computing intentions allows for the integration
of highly relevant information about the context in which
the cooperative action took place. Contextual aspects of great
significance include the incentives that the partner faced and the
affordances she benefitted from.
How, then, can we predict behavior on the basis of past
intentions? One hypothesis is that people infer others’ intentions
from their actions and then further infer underlying dispositions
and skills from intentions and context. In particular, people
attribute social preferences to others that account for motives
that are not self-interested. It is these inferred social preferences
that eventually matter when it comes to forming beliefs about
cooperativeness. Such beliefs allow people to make predictions
about future cooperative choices in diverse contexts. The
processes include:
1. Inferring intentions from outcomes and contextual
information. In particular, when someone makes a choice
that has beneficial consequences, we can infer whether these
consequences were side effects or whether they were intended.
2. Making inferences from the content of intentions in one
instance to the individual willingness to cooperate in other
contexts. One possible way to do this is to infer personality
traits of the agent. For instance, if someone has the intention
to make altruistic choices, then we think of her as an altruistic
person. On the basis of this disposition, one can make
predictions about future choices in new contexts and for new
problems. Other types of inferences might be at work.
Computing others’ intentions enables integrating many
contextual information for assessing how cooperative one is
likely to be in the future. We have noted that this contextual
information is relevant to strategic vigilance because an outcome
can be beneficial or detrimental due to contextual aspects that are
unlikely to occur again. Recovering underlying intentions teases
apart multiple factors that lead to the outcome: competence,
environmental opportunities and, possibly, interests in specific
cooperative ventures, as well as other mental states.
We have now pointed out the increase in accuracy which
computing intentions might provide, compared to outcome-
only-based inferences. In the next sub-section, we review
empirical evidence showing that human strategic vigilance is a set
of implemented processes that indeed rely on inferred intentions.
Evaluating Intentions: Empirical Evidence
With 40 years of psychology on mind-reading,3 there is plenty
of evidence suggesting that people can successfully infer others’
intentions, even if these conflict with the observable outcomes
(e.g., Cushman, 2008; Ames and Fiske, 2015; Rand et al., 2015).
Even young infants and children form expectations of agents’
behavior that rely on inferred intentions (e.g., Gergely et al., 1995;
Meltzoff, 1995; Sutter, 2007).
Intentions, having been computed, are also taken into
consideration in moral evaluation. Moral judgments, indeed, are
made on the basis of both unobservable mental states (intentions,
beliefs, and desires) and observable physical states (physical
constraints, exerted effort, and realized consequences, Cushman,
2015). In particular, people distinguish situations where the good
or bad outcome was intended or not, and evaluate the acting
agent’s personality accordingly (Tooby et al., 2006; Cushman,
2008). In experimental economic games, participants appreciate
others’ good intentions, despite their failure to contribute (Rand
et al., 2015). There is some evidence that even preverbal infants
judge agents in view of their intentions rather than on outcome
alone: a study byHamlin (2013) showed that 8-month-old infants
prefer puppets who, despite their helping efforts, fail to help
another, over puppets who try to hinder another in distress, but
accidentally help. Although it is still debated whether infants
this young really prefer helpers to hinderers (see Salvadori et al.,
2015), there is a consensus that preschool-aged children can
already make sophisticated moral judgments when intentions
and outcomes are not necessarily aligned (Leslie et al., 2006; Vaish
et al., 2010).
We do not claim that people are completely unaffected
by outcomes when they evaluate others’ cooperativeness or
infer other social dispositions. What we emphasize is that
people are able to infer underlying intentions, in addition to
evaluating others based on the observed outcomes of their
actions. Therefore, the mere existence of the “outcome bias” (i.e.,
when moral judgments are affected by observed outcomes, see
Gino et al., 2009b) does not contradict this proposed aspect of
3Mind-reading is also called Theory of Mind, or mentalizing. The milestones that
are often thought as the origin of the surge of research on mind-reading are
Dennett (1978) and Premack and Woodruff (1978), which focused on attribution
of false beliefs.
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strategic vigilance; that is, people infer and take into account
intentions when evaluating potential partners. In a series of
cross-cultural studies, Barrett et al. (2016) revealed that moral
judgments are universally influenced by intentions, even though
societies can give a larger role to the outcomes when evaluating an
agent’s actions—possibly because of cultural beliefs that people’s
intentions are hard to guess (Barrett et al., 2016).
One relevant piece of information for evaluating intentions
is the observed effort an agent makes in order to achieve a
certain outcome, or the cost that an agent incurs when she
interacts with others. All else being equal, the more effortful an
unselfish action is in terms of energy, time or monetary cost,
the more effectively it signals that one is helpful and creates
the impression of prosociality. This is indeed what Delton and
Robertson (2012) found in a series of studies in hypothetical
food foraging scenarios. Their participants rated people who
incurred a larger cost, but provided only small benefits more
positively than people who provided large benefits but incurred
a minimal cost. This result supports the assertion that adults
make sophisticated judgments about others’ cooperativeness, and
take into account intentions, by looking at the incurred costs and
exerted effort as well as the outcomes. Following the same line of
argument, ethnographic studies in pre-industrial societies have
documented that an individual’s cooperativeness is not simply
judged by the amount of goods or services he provides, rather it
is usually inferred from the effort the individual makes, or the
cost he incurs when taking part in a collective activity (Price,
2006; Lyle and Smith, 2014; Bird and Power, 2015). The ability
to conditionally reciprocate others’ good intentions with good
actions also begins to emerge early in childhood. A study by
Dunfield et al. (2013) showed that children, by 3 years of age, can
already identify situations when a communicator is helpful, and
in turn, selectively cooperative with her. By the age of 7, children
already anticipate that others will infer intentions from their (i.e.,
the children’s own) actions, and are motivated to maintain a
positive image. For instance, Shaw et al. (2016) show that 7–
8 years old children can already apply sophisticated, context-
dependent strategies when they decide about the allocation of
goods between themselves and others.
Another key element for strategic vigilance is assessing the
credibility of trustworthiness signals (Brosig, 2002; Henrich,
2009). Rockenbach and Milinski (2011) found that people are
able to identify situations in which they have to be more vigilant
because the potential benefits for dishonest signaling are high.
The importance of this ability is reflected in the results which
show that human strategic thinking becomes sophisticated quite
rapidly, allowing us to detect manipulative intentions early in
childhood (Ayal and Gino, 2011). By the age of 4, children are
able to distinguish others’ accidental errors from intentionally
deceptive actions, and can therefore identify agents who are more
likely to deceive them in a certain context (Mascaro and Sperber,
2009). By the age of 7, children can already anticipate deceptive
moves in complex strategic settings with novel partners (Sher
et al., 2014), and make subtle evaluations about trustworthiness
when honesty conflicts with benevolence (Xu et al., 2013).
Cognitive processes enabling adaptive choices of partners for
cooperative activities are far more complex than a weighting of
past benefits gained from cooperation. These processes provide
the means for integrating a lot of relevant information from the
context in addition to information about the outcome of past
cooperative activities. We have argued that one way to do that
is to infer and evaluate the underlying intentions of choices in
strategic situations. Strategic vigilance, we conclude, pays special
attention to the intentions that generate the observed behavior
and evaluates what these intentions reveal about the cooperative
dispositions of the potential partner (his moral and prosocial
preferences, for instance). We will now point to a striking parallel
with choices putting one’s own honesty at stake: these choices
are such that the underlying intentions cannot be interpreted as
uncooperative. It suggests that these choices are driven by putting
one’s own strategic vigilance at work on one’s own behavior.
ADAPTIVE PREFERENCES CAUSE
PATTERNS OF HONESTY
Experimental Evidence on Dishonesty
Recent experimental studies about dishonesty specify the limiting
conditions that reveal the trade-off between taking as much as
possible from an interaction and the desire to act as a worthwhile
cooperator (Mazar et al., 2008). In a series of studies examining
the propensity to cheat researchers asked participants to roll dice
and report the result. Participants had an incentive to lie because
certain numbers had higher payoffs than others. Furthermore,
participants were ensured that nobody but themselves would
know what the number really was (Fischbacher and Föllmi-
Heusi, 2013). The finding is that people do lie, but tend to report
a credible result that does not depart from the true numbers too
much. For instance when they could maximize their payoff by
rolling a 6, they did not always report 6, but still lied a few times.
Only around 2.5% of participants lied to maximize their gains,
regardless of the actual outcome observed (Shalvi et al., 2011).
These patterns of behavior suggest that people are motivated
to uphold an image of themselves as honest cooperators: they
want to signal that they are willing to incur costs or forgo
potential benefits by ‘playing by the rules.’ And indeed, when
people cheat only a bit, within the plausible limits, the act of
cheating is hardly detected by others. In one of their follow-
up studies, Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi (2013) investigated
others’ guesses about the distribution of die-rolls and found
that 61% of observers unfamiliar with the paradigm would not
detect partial lying. A similar pattern of lying emerged in the
matrix experimental paradigm (e.g., Mazar et al., 2008; Gino
et al., 2013), in which participants reported their performance
on math-related tasks, and were incentivized to report a
good performance. Participants tended to report solving more
problems than they actually solved, yet they increased the true
number only slightly.
Strategies in these experiments rarely maximize monetary
payoff. Rather, the most common strategy consists in lying
to increase monetary payoff, but not to the extent that could
be easily detected. Since the reports are bent only inasmuch
to remain plausible, people using this strategy have to take
into account the capacity of others to detect lies: therefore the
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strategy is adapted to strategically vigilant observers. However,
in the studies described above, such strategies were used in
spite of the fact that being thought of as a blatant liar had
no consequences in the experimental context where anonymity
is credibly implemented. A straightforward explanation for the
adoption of this strategy is that people unconditionally care
about the opinion of others to some extent, regardless of the
future consequences (Bénabou and Tirole, 2006; Ariely et al.,
2009). Furthermore, decisions aimed at maintaining a good
image are informed by the understanding that others have limited
information about the context, yet are strategically vigilant—
lying is possible, yet constrained by plausibility. For example,
participants in Shalvi et al.’s (2011) study presumably perceived
the desirable outcome as more likely to happen—and thus the lie
asmore plausible—thanwhen they did not observe a die-roll with
a high result.
Some strategies, however, cannot be explained by a preference
for being esteemed by others: the maintenance of one’s self-
concept (Mazar et al., 2008) seems to play a role as well. Evidence
for this claim comes from experiments using the protocols
described above and manipulating how easily participants can
justify their actions to themselves. The prevalence of dishonest
behavior decreases when moral standards are made salient and
increases when potential justifications are easily available. More
precisely, factors that modulate the rate of dishonest choices
include in- and out-group membership of the agents involved
(Gino et al., 2009a), commitment, moral reminders (Mazar
et al., 2008), and whether or not the self-serving lie could be
plausibly justified as a mistake (Pittarello et al., 2015). In general,
participants misreport more when they can present misreporting
as resulting from an intention that is not uncooperative, like
misperception of the number on the die rather than an intention
to deceive. Similarly, misreporting guided by the intention
to help potential cooperators such as group members is not
seen as uncooperative: cheating increases significantly when it
benefits others rather than the decision maker alone, wherein
the presence of other beneficiaries decreases feelings of guilt and
negative ratings of one’s morality (Gino et al., 2013).4
Psychological Mechanisms and Their
Adaptive Value
The theory of self-concept maintenance, proposed by Mazar,
Ariely and their colleagues is meant to account for the above
findings. It asserts that what matters to people is whether the
choices fall squarely in place with other clearly immoral actions
or can be interpreted in a self-serving way as being moral. In
the latter case, it is possible to reap the material benefits of
dishonest choice, without having to update one’s self-concept
in the negative direction; a condition referred to as “relative
malleability” (Mazar et al., 2008; p. 634). It is possible to
categorize one’s own choices as moral only up to a certain extent,
and some choices inevitably lead to revising one’s self-concept.
4The increase of lying when it leads to benefiting other people could be accounted
for by a preference for reputation as well, i.e. the people who benefit from one’s
lie might hold the liar in higher regard. The preference for self-esteem and the
preference for having a good reputation are tightly interconnected, but it is worth
to analyse the effect of each separately.
The central claim of the self-concept maintenance theory is that
negatively updating the self-concept is aversive, hence dishonesty
will be more prevalent in cases where updating can be avoided.
Similarly, attention to moral standards makes dishonest actions
more salient in comparison to one’s internalized beliefs about
what is desirable or valued, and thus more likely to influence the
self-concept. We extend the above psychological analysis with an
evolutionary perspective. How can self-esteem or maintenance of
a moral self-concept be an adaptive preference?
Self-concept maintenance adaptively is adaptive because it
improves the performance of calculated Machiavellian strategy
for reputation management. Because of human cognitive
boundedness, people are limited in their ability to simultaneously
track the multitude of beliefs that potential partners might
have about them. Furthermore, people do not have the
capacity to continuously and separately update all of these
individual opinions in view of their choices. However, people can
approximate others’ opinions by applying their strategic vigilance
to their behavior, thereby constructing and maintaining a self-
image. When combined with a preference for self-esteem, this
produces a willingness to behave as a good cooperator according
to the standards of other worthwhile potential cooperators,
yet without actually tracking their opinions. A desire for
maintaining high self-esteem is a reliable cognitive mechanism
for maintaining a good reputation (see Kurzban, 2012).
It has also been argued that if one believes oneself to be moral,
it will be easier to convince others that one is moral (Trivers,
1985). Frank (1988) argued that having a genuine concern for
one’s moral standing is a reliable means for convincing others
that one is a good potential cooperator. By contrast, alternating
between self-serving dishonesty and prosocial signaling is likely
to produce false negatives, cases where one chooses self-serving
dishonesty without realizing its detrimental effect on reputation.
Frank’s hypothesis is justified because potential partners’ strategic
vigilance prevents one from gaming their value as a potential
partner. Selfish intentions are likely to be recognized as such, and
pro-social intentions are likely to be valued more, because they
provide some evidence that the potential partner will not seize all
contextual opportunities to increase her selfish gain at one’s own
expense.
Monitoring self-image is a reliable process for a bounded
Machiavellian agent to maintain a positive reputation. Indeed,
studies on dishonesty show that it is possible to maintain self-
esteem while reaping as much of the material benefits as possible,
because the motives for making prosocial choices are based on
justifiability (Shalvi et al., 2015). This dependence on justifiability
shows that people are prone to internally negotiate what it takes
to be a good cooperator, and that this negotiation is done with
constraints set by strategic vigilance. Selfish but justifiable courses
of actions are consequently taken: this is adaptive because it does
not affect reputation, while increases direct fitness.
The adaptive value of preferences for positive reputation
and self-esteem also lies in the similarity between the choices
that these preferences motivate and the choices that convince
observers that the chooser is a desirable partner. In the case
of a preference for positive reputation, the similarity is a
consequence of an accurate understanding of what others value,
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and what behavior is likely to convince them that one is a good
cooperator. In the case of the preference for self-esteem, the
similarity is a consequence of evaluating one’s own behavior
with the same means, the same strategic vigilance, as observers
would. Generalizing on that point, we predict that people
will systematically build a self-image that appeals to the most
worthy and accessible cooperators in their environment, and
care less about the values of agents they deem to be worse
cooperators. This process makes self-concept maintenance a
proximal mechanism for reputation management that is flexible
to the specific values of one’s community.
Furthermore, prosocial preferences driven by the desire to
maintain a good image are adaptive when they lead one to
find the best trade-off between investment in reputation and
immediate gains. This adaptive trade-off is best illustrated with
the phenomenon of moral licensing, wherein a good deed can
increase the likelihood of subsequent immoral behavior (for a
review, see Merritt et al., 2010). In strategic vigilance terms, if
one has accumulated ample proof of being an honest cooperator,
she can allow herself to upset the balance by a self-serving
action without the worry of seriously endangering self- and
social image. The effect goes both ways: when primed by writing
a negative story about themselves, people are more likely to
donate to charity as opposed to after writing a positive or neutral
story (Sachdeva et al., 2009). Similarly, studies in impression
management have shown effects such as generalized image repair
(Baumeister, 1982) which demonstrate that being alerted to one’s
negative reputation in a community elicits more instances of
prosocial behavior (Steele, 1975).
The list of adaptive features of self-concept maintenance
therefore includes the following aspects:
1. It decreases the false negatives that a calculated Machiavellian
strategy and preference for maintaining a good reputation
would produce: self-concept maintenance often motivates
making the choices that one would make if he knew he was
observed.
2. It convinces strategically vigilant others that one is a desirable
partner better than selfish preferences and preference for
maintaining a good reputation. This is because strategically
vigilant others are very competent at recovering underlying
intentions, and because selfish preferences and preferences for
maintaining a good reputation are less likely to motivate the
partner’s prosocial choices across different contexts.
3. It motivates making choices that are valued by desirable
partners and do not motivate prosocial choices that they are
not likely to value. This is because:
a. The values of desirable partners are more likely to be
internalized than the values of inaccessible and undesirable
partners.
b. The opinion of desirable partners are reliably simulated in
context by using one’s own strategic vigilance.
Points 1 and 2 show that self-concept maintenance is a
mechanism that improves the likelihood of being chosen by
desirable partners for mutually beneficial enterprises. It improves
this likelihood over self-interest seeking with guile and over
interest in positive reputation. Point 3 shows that self-concept
maintenance will not motivate making costly prosocial choices
that are unlikely to increase one’s value as a partner among
desirable partners. In the next section, we contrast this adaptive
feature with the features of evolved preferences for norm
abidance and fairness.
CONCLUSION
Predicting the future cooperativeness of potential partners is an
inferential task based on the limited information provided by
past behavior, observed in context. In particular, the desirable
traits of potential cooperators are relatively opaque, especially
with regard to their interest in cooperating in specific ventures,
which depends on their social preferences, their immediate
cost of cooperating, the expected cost of negative reputation
and other factors. This has important consequences for the
evolution of both strategic vigilance and social preferences.
Strategic vigilance requires powerful inferential mechanisms
whose evolved functions include the ability to estimate with
whom it would be better to cooperate in the future. The
hypothesis that human cognition evolved largely for dealing
with social life can thus be enriched with a specification of
the cognitive tasks which, when solved, make cooperation
advantageous. Cooperation, rather than competition alone,
would then provide selection pressures for the evolution of social
cognitive skills (Moll and Tomasello, 2007).
In a biological market, the adaptive answer to strategically
vigilant others is to anticipate their inferences about one’s own
behavior. We have seen that preferences for maintaining a good
image in the eyes of others (reputation) and in one’s own
eyes (self-image) do just that. Are such evolved preferences
complemented with evolved distributive preferences and/or a
preference for abiding by the social norms? Let us consider them
in turn.
Norm Abidance
Evaluations of honesty usually assess compliance with agreed-
upon rules of action, whether these rules are explicit or not.
Mazar et al.’s (2008) cognitive account of dishonesty assumes
that there is a preference for a good self-image, that can be
maintained by abidance to certain internalized moral norms or
standards—such as ‘do not lie.’ They then make the hypothesis
that this preference is supplemented with a capacity to muddle
the boundaries of the class of actions that count as moral rule
following. This further hypothesis extends the standard account
which explains honest and dishonest choices as resulting from
maximizing the utility, derived from either norm compliance or
from selfish material gains. In this framework, people can choose
to be dishonest when the temptation is high and/or when they
have weak preferences for being honest. It leads to the prediction
that deciding to break a moral norm will lead one to go ‘all the
way’ to maximize material benefits, which has been refuted by
experimental results showing that people often choose to cheat
a little or lie by a little margin only. Assessing honesty is very
different from a binary classification of actions (complied or not
to the social norm), usually leaving plenty of wiggle room.
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In particular, we have emphasized that a lot of interpretative
work is being done: interpreting how to apply a rule in a given
context and inferring the underlying intentions from actions.
Ethnographic studies of moral behavior likewise show that moral
norms are subject to diverse interpretations depending on the
context and the interests of the people involved (e.g., Humphrey,
1997). In certain contexts, norms might conflict with each other
(e.g., equality vs. effort-based distribution of goods), and people
might ‘cherry-pick’ among available norms in a self-serving way.
For example, when the equal allocation of goods provides more
benefits, people tend to evaluate it as more morally justified,
compared to the case in which they would receive more from an
effort-based (unequal) allocation (Cappelen et al., 2014; DeScioli
et al., 2014). This is not to say that anything goes: the ‘chosen’
norm and the corresponding action have to be adequately
justifiable in the given context in order to convince strategically
vigilant others that one is worth cooperating with.
There are quite a few factors that determine whether and how
a rule of behavior will impinge on choices (Bicchieri, 2006). These
factors include the content of the rule (e.g., one is reluctant to
abide by a disgusting rule), the origin of the rule (e.g., it was
dictated by a malevolent person), what one thinks others think
of the rule (e.g., nobody thinks it is important to pay for tram
tickets), as well as assessments of the costs and benefits of abiding
by the rule. How are these factors combined in decision making?
For instance, Gneezy (2005) investigated how the consequences
of lying are evaluated. Mazar et al. (2008) do not specify which
cognitive processes allow for muddling moral categories. Partner
choice theory, together with the observations we made on
strategic vigilance, lead to the hypothesis that people have evolved
mechanisms that use agreed upon or social rules of behavior as
source of information for what it takes to be a good cooperator
in the eyes of potential partners. They have a good sense of
what is expected of them, and these expectations are constantly
informed and updated by communication (e.g., public debates
about what should be allowed, legislation) and observations of
the consequences of others’ behavior (e.g., precedents, salience
of actions, punishments and rewards). Mechanisms of strategic
vigilance evaluate what can be expected from an interaction
on the basis of implicit or explicit contextual agreements or
cultural norms and, on the same basis, assess the justifiability
of partners’ potential expectations. It is during this process that
one can find wiggle room allowing more selfish behavior. Still,
rules or social norms do guide social behavior and foster prosocial
choice, because ignoring them would lead to disappointing one’s
partner: a consequence people would prefer to avoid (Heintz
et al., 2015). If one follows this thread of reasoning, it is the
potential partners’ expectations—whose content is influenced by
the rule of behavior—that have a motivating power; not the social
rule itself.
We have argued that preferences which motivate honesty are
geared toward managing what others might think of oneself. In
particular, one wants to be thought of as a good cooperator and
also think of oneself as such. The behavior indicative of being
a good cooperator is highly dependent on contextual factors as
well as beliefs about partners’ expectations that are informed by
social norms. The evolutionary story that we advocate, based on
partner choice theory, leads to a specific measure of adaptiveness
that informs psychological theories. It can be contrasted with
another evolutionary story of prosocial behavior and norm
abidance: some social scientists (e.g., Richerson et al., 2016)
have argued that people have a biologically evolved preference
to abide by social norms and to do as the majority does.
Because groups with prosocial social norms will do better than
groups with non-prosocial norms, prosocial norms will thrive
and people will end up preferring to abide by prosocial norms.
This explains prosocial preferences as resulting from a preference
to abide by (and enforce) social norms. But why would we
then observe the small misdemeanors reviewed above? A post-
hoc hypothesis could state that the processes interpreting social
norms in context enable muddling them. Our evolutionary story,
on the other hand, places the selection pressures elsewhere and
leads to hypothesizing that norm abidance is a consequence of
preferences that have evolved for reputation management. A
comparison of the plausibility of each of those two theories is
beyond the scope of this paper. Here, we have only described a
consistent psychological and evolutionary theory of the patterns
of honesty, which we believe to be a serious rival to cultural group
selection theory explanations.
Distributive Preferences
Relying on partner choice theory, rather than cultural group
selection theory, Baumard et al. (2013) have made hypotheses
about the proximal mechanisms that evolved for impression
management, which lead to making prosocial choices. We have
argued that impression management for partner choice is done
via three mechanisms: calculated Machiavellian strategies, a
preference for maintaining a good image in the eyes of others,
and a preference for having positive self-esteem. But for Baumard
et al. (2013), impression management is achieved thanks to an
evolved preference for fair outcomes. Has such a preference truly
evolved to supplement the three mechanisms mentioned? There
are two reasons to think that this is not the case.
First, an evolved preference for fair distributions would
increase the number of false positives (making an altruistic choice
which does not add to one’s reputation). In many cases, choosing
a fair distribution might overshoot, making an unnecessary
sacrifice, and letting others benefit more than would be useful.
For instance, if what is deemed honest by the members of one’s
community is to give no more than one third of the hunted
game to a low-born hunting partner, then why would one give
more than that? It might result in a distribution of costs and
benefits that is directly advantageous to the high-born hunter, but
in certain market conditions, this kind of practices can perdure.
Of course, the economic dynamics of the market of co-hunters
might, in some conditions, lead to the cultural evolution of
fairer social norms, but the fair choices would then result from
cultural evolution rather than directly from an evolved preference
for fairness. One can increase immediate benefits and still be
a good potential partner if others are satisfied with little or if
it is socially acceptable to take more for oneself. Consequently,
the means for maintaining a good reputation is to act on the
basis of what others think is fair, which is partly determined
by cultural traditions. In that perspective, the theory of evolved
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preferences for fair outcomes paints too rosy a picture of social
life: assuming that people already have evolved intuitions about
fair distributions and honest behavior gives too little importance
to the social dynamics that spread cultural beliefs about what is
fair and honest. By contrast, we predict that in a human market
of cooperators, these beliefs are at stake. When a member of a
community has a good grasp of what others think is fair and
honest and has ‘internalized’ these beliefs, then preferences for
fairness and norm abidance are redundant in the presence of
preferences for good reputation and self-esteem.
The features of the preferences for others’ and self-esteem
which make it possible to reduce the cost of maintaining a
good reputation are listed in Section Psychological Mechanisms
and their Adaptive Value; to reiterate: the choices that would
disappoint desirable partners are avoided, but opportunities to
make self-serving choices that are unlikely to have a negative
effect on reputation are promptly seized. Preferences for others’
esteem and self-esteem are based on how choices can be justified.
They rely on strategic vigilance put to work, this time, for
monitoring the opinions of potential partners. It is unlikely that
a preference for fair outcomes would significantly reduce the
number of false negatives (failing tomake an altruistic choice that
would have importantly improved reputation) over preferences
for others’ esteem and self-esteem. We conclude that an evolved
preference for fairness would not increase fitness derived from
having a good reputation, yet, it would decrease fitness derived
from making self-interested choices. It is therefore not obvious
that a selection pressure existed for the evolution of a preference
for fair distributions to supplement preferences for others’ esteem
and self-esteem.
The second reason to be skeptical about the existence of
this type of preference is that it makes it difficult to account
for a range of empirical data which show that people prefer
justifiable self-serving choices rather than fair distributions.
For instance, when they are rewarded for performance, it is
unfair that the participants who misreport get more money
than those who perform well, but do not misreport. Such
data could be explained by saying that the preference for fair
distributions, in some individuals, is less pronounced, and that
the temptation to misreport is strong. But this does not account
for the specific factors that modulate the rate of misreporting:
justifiability in the eyes of potential observers and the self. Some
experiments reviewed above provide evidence that manipulating
the justifications available has an effect on rule compliance and
prosociality even when the content of the social rule or potential
distributions remain the same. The theory of evolved preferences
for fair outcomes still needs to explain how such data can be
accounted for. Similarly, Heintz et al. (2015) reviewed a set of
experiments showing that, when participants are asked to make
a monetary transfer, they are prompt to make unfair transfers
when these will not disappoint their partners. For instance,
participants will often choose means to decrease their partners’
expectations from an interaction over sacrificing their benefits for
a fair distribution (see, e.g., Dana et al., 2006; Hauge, 2016). Such
situations reveal that what matters to people is to be able to justify
their choices to their partners (and themselves), rather than the
distribution of costs and benefits per se.
Recent theories explaining how partner choice can give rise
to adaptive mechanisms that motivate making prosocial choices
provide valuable alternatives over competitive theories of human
prosociality, such as cultural group selection theory. Yet, partner
choice theorists have given too little attention to the specifics
of strategic vigilance as constitutive of the selection pressures
for the evolution of mechanisms motivating prosocial choices.
We speculate that mechanisms for reputation management and
strategic vigilance co-evolved in an arms-race: mechanisms
for convincing others of one’s cooperative value evolved to
outperformmechanisms of strategic vigilance by paying as little a
cost as possible for cooperation, while taking as much as possible
from its benefits, and mechanisms of strategic vigilance evolved
to prevent gaming and select the truly best cooperative option.
There are several competing strategies that allow having a good
reputation. Among these strategies, some are more efficient than
others: they achieve the goal of having a good reputation while
keeping the cost from generous giving or the opportunity cost of
honesty lower. In our opinion, a combination of preferences for
others’ and self-esteem produces the optimal balance of the latter,
as well as providing a plausible evolutionary-flavored account of
the recent findings from experimental economics.
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